

hampered, not by enforced non-intervention but by Italian naval and air attacks against the Mediterranean supply line, that forced Soviet shipments to take the longer northern routes through France to Catalonia. By the time such aid arrived, Republican chances of victory had largely evaporated. Also, Graham assumes that a meditated peace with guarantees against reprisals was possible in 1938, whereas the mindsets of Francoist crusaders and Western appeasers made such an event most unlikely.

Graham is correct in seeing a unified war effort as central to military effectiveness. Yet also essential was an effective strategy, which the Republic lacked. Republican leaders abandoned the Straits to Franco who shipped the formidable Army of Africa and later reinforcements to Spain, abandoned Mallorca to the Italians who made it into a major naval and air base, and repudiated for partisan political reasons the Extremadura offensive plan, which Graham dismisses, to threaten Franco's territorial unity and supply lines. Any of these operational issues competently addressed would have greatly boosted Republican fortunes and in combination would likely have been decisive. The mind, more than matériel, prevented a coherent strategy towards victory. In 1937, as opportunity slipped away, defensive positions absorbed far too many troops while offensives served only a prolonged defence. By the fall of the northern front in October, the fate of the Republic was sealed, barring a European war, for which Negrín forlornly hoped.

Despite such problematical issues weakening her synthesis, Graham provides a splendid analysis of the politics of the left in the Spanish Republic that will fruitfully engage scholars for many years to come.

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FLORENTINO RODAO. *Franco y el imperio japonés: Imágenes y propaganda en tiempos de guerra*. Barcelona: Plaza and Janés, 2002. Pp. 668. €18.00.

IN 1943, DURING a conversation with the US ambassador at Madrid, Carlton Hayes, the Spanish dictator, Francisco Franco, presented a fanciful three-war theory that postulated three armed conflicts taking place simultaneously: a war of the Anglo-Saxon powers against Germany in which Spain was neutral; a war of the civilized nations against Japanese barbarism in which Madrid, in reality, stood behind the United States; and a war against Communism in which Spain was a belligerent, and supported Germany.

Hayes remained unimpressed. Although Franco hurried to declare Spain's official neutrality, as soon as hostilities broke out his sympathy for the Axis countries became an open secret. In fact, until the beginning of 1944, Franco continued to believe, with greater or lesser conviction, that Germany would emerge victorious from the war. As to relations with Japan, Hayes knew well how Franco and his foreign minister, Ramón Serrano Suñer, rejoiced when they first heard about the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on

7 December 1941. An official telegram of congratulations was sent from Madrid to Tokyo. Franco also agreed, in 1942, to represent Japan's interests in Latin America, and the Falangist press was unrestrained in its pro-Japanese enthusiasm.

Much has been written in recent years about Spain's neutrality in the Second World War, which began only five months after the official conclusion of the Spanish Civil War and the establishment of Franco's government in Madrid. However, most of the research has been devoted either to the European scene or to Francoist Spain's ambitions for cultural and ideological hegemony in Latin America. Very little attention has been given to Spanish policies towards East Asia, although Spain had traditional interests in the region. Florentino Rodao's new book makes an important contribution to filling this gap. Based on a wide selection of both primary and secondary sources, mainly in Spanish, Japanese, and English, the book covers wartime Spanish-Japanese relations, which were characterized by drastic changes, ranging from an idealization of Japan to a near-declaration of war against it within a short span of time.

The initial enthusiasm for Japan evaporated rapidly. Economic and political realism forced Franco to improve his relations with the United States and Britain, and Spain resented the Japanese invasion and occupation of the Philippines, a former Spanish colony. However, only in April 1945 did the Franco regime break off relations with Japan after Japanese forces had invaded Spanish diplomatic facilities in Manila and carried out a massacre.

One of the book's merits is its discussion of cultural stereotypes and images of Japan among the 'political families' of Francoism. Many Spaniards were impressed with Japan's modernization since the late nineteenth century, and its growing military power. But what seemed especially attractive to Falangists was the mixture of modern technology with conservative and militaristic social values (one should note that Franco himself was always more suspicious of the Japanese and less curious about Asian culture). Anti-Communism was also perceived to link Japan with Spain. Nevertheless, by the end of the war, the image of Japan in the Spanish media, which was controlled by the regime, was completely different: that of a dangerous and cruel Asian enemy of Western civilization.

The most famous incident in wartime Spanish-Japanese relations is the Laurel episode. In October 1943, following the assumption of power by a Japanese puppet government in the Philippines headed by José Laurel, a congratulatory telegram was sent by the Spanish foreign ministry. The United States and Britain protested over what they considered to be the formal recognition of the Laurel regime. Rodao discusses this incident in detail, giving it a slightly different interpretation from the one suggested by Stanley G. Payne in the prologue of the book. Payne regards the telegram as a formal document with little political meaning, that was exploited by the United States in order to bring pressure on the Franco regime.

Lastly, the book describes the network of spies formed by Spanish diplomats and journalists in order to supply the Japanese with information about Britain and the United States.

Rodao's book is recommended not only to those interested in Spanish and Japanese foreign relations, but also to scholars of the Second World War and the internal dynamics of the Franco regime.

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ALEXANDER B. ROSSINO. *Hitler Strikes Poland: Blitzkrieg, Ideology, and Atrocity*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003. Pp. xv, 343. \$34.95 (US).

WHEN ADOLF HITLER struck Poland, he initiated a new kind of war. His racist ideology influenced the treatment of the conquered population; in the crimes that were committed against that population, the German army participated along with specifically Nazi organizations. None of this is new. Among others, Wolfgang Jacobmeyer, 'Der Überfall auf Polen und der neue Charakter des Kriegs', in *September 1939: Krieg, Besatzung, Widerstand in Polen*, ed. C. Klessmann (1989); J. Connelly, 'Nazis and Slavs: From Racial Theory to Racist Practice', *Central European History*, xxxii (1999); and the controversial photo exhibit *Verbrechen der Wehrmacht* dealt with aspects of the topic of Alexander B. Rossino's new book. Nevertheless, it is a welcome addition to the English-language literature. Well written and thoroughly documented, haunting in its graphic descriptions and photographs of atrocities, it deserves a wide audience.

For Rossino, what makes Hitler's war new is not just the blitzkrieg but its combination with Nazi ideology. The invasion targeted both the Polish army and the civilian population, and German policy relied on mass murder to achieve its goals from the beginning of the war. Describing the backgrounds of the men who led the operational groups in Poland, Rossino persuasively argues that they were specially chosen to carry out this mission. As for the German army, although some officers condemned the wanton killing of civilians, the allegations that Polish troops killed ethnic Germans and the resistance offered by Polish irregulars made it easier for the military to cooperate with the operational groups. Similarly, when some senior German army officers objected to the violence directed against Polish Jews, they did so not out of moral compunction but out of a concern for maintaining the discipline of the army and order in the rear of the Front. Yet, the German military in many instances co-operated with the SS in its anti-Jewish operations, and Rossino sees this as evidence of the military's acceptance of Nazi goals and methods.

According to Rossino, the army's actions were based on widely shared ethnic stereotypes of Poles and Jews. For the German military, the Polish